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Locke on Substance in General

Locke’s conception of substance in general or substratum has two relatively widespread interpretations. According to one, substance in general is the bearer of properties, a pure subject, something which sustains properties but itself has no properties. I will call this interpretation traditional, because it has already been formulated by Leibniz.​[1]​ According to the other interpretation, substance is general is something like real essence: an underlying structure which is responsible for the fact that certain observable properties form stable, recurrent clusters.
	I will argue that both interpretation are partly right, and what is good in them can be reconciled. The traditional interpretation captures the purpose and signficanc of the idea of substance in general, i.e. the reason why Locke says we have this idea.  The real essence view is right about the real world counterpart of the idea, i.e. what sort of entity the idea corresponds to. The paper starts with a review of the strengths and weaknesses of the rival interpretations (I, II). Then I examine which part of the traditional interpretation can be sustained in light of the problems it faces (III). Thereafter I will show that the part of the traditional interpretation which can be sustained cannot stand on its own and needs to be supplemented at one point, and the real essence view can provide what is needed. This, as it were, mixed interpretation will be supported by sketching an argument which is plausible within the context of Locke’s teachings and which explains how Locke could have arrived from the view which the traditional interpretation correctly attributes to him to the view which the real essence interpretation takes him to espouse (IV). The two problematic points in this argument will be taken up in the following two sections. (V, VI). Finally, I will provide some evidence from the Drafts for Locke’s identification of substance and essence (VII).

I
If we disregard the finer details, two elements of Locke’s conception of substance stand beyond dispute. The first is that his account of the origin of the idea of substance goes as follows. We experience certain recurrent clusters of properties.​[2]​ Unable to conceive how these clusters can subsist in themselves, we presume that they have some support, and this presumed support is what Locke calls substance in general or substratum.​[3]​ The second is his claim that we are completely ignorant of substance in general. We only have an obscure and confused idea of what it does, namely that it supports properties, but we have no idea of what it is.​[4]​ Indeed, Locke pokes fun at those who believe that speculations about substance amount to genuine knowledge.
	On the traditional interpretation these two elements are closely connected.​[5]​ Locke is said to develop the idea of substance in general in order to answer the question about the bearer of properties, which arises in this way. When asked what is red and sweet, we answer ‘the apple’. But being an apple is a property itself, so it must be a property of something. If we are asked what is an apple, we might mention solid, extended parts. But solidity and extension are also properties in need of support, so the question can be raised once again, and no matter how we answer, the questions will not come to an end as long as the answer mentions something which can be considered a property possessed by something. Consequently, the final bearer of properties, which stops the regress, must be something which itself is not a property of something else. And that can only be some mere bearer of properties, a pure subject, which cannot be described in terms of its properties or its nature because it has not got any. It is this unpropertied property-bearer which Locke calls substance in general. If this is indeed what Locke means by substance, then our ignorance of substance is easy to understand. To know what something is amounts to knowing what sort of thing it is, what properties it has. But substance cannot be described in terms of its properties, because it has not got any. This is why it can stop the regress.
	The great advantage of this view is that it provides a very natural reading of Locke’s text. Locke regularly speaks of substance as the ‘support’ of properties, as something ‘in which’ properties exist. He also explicitly says that we need the idea of substance to terminate the regress of questions concerning the bearer of properties.​[6]​ 
	The great disadvantage is that there are several reasons why we should not attribute this view to Locke. First of all, invoking substance in general does not really answer the question it is supposed to. Suppose we regard the question about the bearer of properties as a deep question, and we are not satisfied with the usual answers; e.g. if someone asks ‘What is red and sweet?’, we find the usual answer, ‘It is the apple’, unsatisfactory. This usual answer is not unsatisfactory by being false, because it is not false. It is unsatisfactory because it is not deep enough: it fails to specify closely enough in virtue of what the apple is able support properties. By saying apple, we capture certain properties, the ones which make an apple apple, and it is not in virtue of these properties that the apple is able to support properties. So the feat must be accomplished by something else, and it is this something else we have to describe in order to answer the question concerning the bearer of properties. But Locke thinks we cannot say what substance is, so bringing in substance is not much of an answer. We should not read Locke as intending the doctrine of substance in general as an answer to the quesion about the bearer of properties if the doctrine does not provide a genuine an answer. Moreover, Locke himself  is perfectly aware that we cannot provide genuine answers in terms of substance.  

Had the poor Indian Philosopher (who imagined that that the Earth also wanted something to bear it up) but thought of the word Substance, he need not to have been at the trouble to find an Elephant to support it, and a Tortoise to support his Elephant: the word Substance would have done it effectually.​[7]​ 

	Secondly, Locke’s description of our ignorance of substance in general does not accord well with the ignorance we would suffer from with respect to the unpropertied bearer of properties. Our ignorance of the unpropertied bearer of properties, of the mere subject, is ignorance in principle. The mere subject rules out the possibility of knowledge by its very concept. It merely supports properties, but does not have any, so it is all too natural that we can only say what it does but not what it is. Perhaps one should not even be bothered by this ignorance. One might just as well claim that we know all about substance that can be known about it at all. However, Locke does not remark that our ignorance of substance is special, that it is different from ordinary cases of ignorance. All he says is that we have no clear idea of it, which is a fairly general cause of our ignorance.
	Not only does Locke fail to comment on the special, in principle character of our ignorance of substance, his discussion in the second half of the chapter on substance indicates that our ignorance of substance is a quite ordinary kind of ignorance. He claims there that the idea of spirit is not more obscure than the idea of body. In both cases we have clear ideas of the most important properties of the substances in question – thinking and will in the case of spirit, cohesion of solid parts and power to communicate motion by impulse in the case of body​[8]​ –, but we cannot explain why they have these properties. He singles out cohesion as illustration. The pressure of the surrounding air, he says, does not provide a general explanation, because air pressure allows that two parts of a body be separated by sliding one of them alongside the surface of contact.​[9]​ The example suggests that what we need here is simply scientific explanation. So it seems that our ignorance of substance is the sort of ignorance we suffer from where we hope for a scientific explanation but we do not have a clue as to what it could be.
	Someone might raise the objection that this discussion is irrelevant, because the substance of spirit and body is a different issue than substance in general, so the nature of our ignorance of the former need not be the same as the nature of our ignorance of the latter. However, the close scrutiny of the text suggests otherwise. Having discussed the nature of our idea of substance in general in II.23.2., Locke goes on to say in the next paragraph that our ideas of kinds of substances are made up of simple ideas, but they also include the idea of something to which these ideas belong, and he brings the idea of body and spirit as examples: “Body is a thing that is extended, figured, and capable of Motion; a Spirit is a thing capable of thinking[.]”. He finishes the paragraph by repeating that “the idea of Substance is supposed always something besides Extension, Figure, Solidity, Motion, Thinking, or other observable Ideas, though we know not what it is.”​[10]​ In the following paragraph he develops the point with respect to corporeal substances, “Hence when we talk or think of any corporeal Substances,”​[11]​ and in the next paragraphs he develops the same point with respect to Spirit as well, “The same happens concerning the Operations of the Mind […] which we concluding not to subsist of themselves, nor apprehending hogy they belong to Body, or produced by it, we are apt to think these the Actions of some other Substance, which we call Spirit[.]” It is here that Locke first concludes that “the Idea of corporeal Substance in Matter is as remote from our Conceptions and Apprehensions, as that of Spiritual Substance[.]”​[12]​ It is very difficult to read these passages as saying that the obscurity of the idea of body and spirit is not the same as the obscurity of substance in general. Nor can it be maintained that Locke’s views about ignorance of substance in general and of body and spirit were developed separately and were merely accidentally merged in these passages, for in the very first paragraph of Draft A of the Essay the view that the our idea of spirit is no more obscure than the idea of matter, is directly derived from the fact that both are built of ideas of simple ideas and the the idea of substance, which is equally obscure in both cases.​[13]​
	The third problem of the traditional interpretation is that the concept of an unpropertied property bearer does not fit in with the treatment of substance in the chapter on identity.​[14]​ Locke does not speak there of substance in general or kinds of substances (gold, man, etc.); he mentions there three substances only, God, finite spirits and bodies. The last of these three includes both atoms and ‘masses of matter’ made up of atoms. Alston and Bennett claim quite convincingly that in this chapter ’substance’ stands for the fundamental constituents of reality.​[15]​ Why should not Locke rest content with these three substances as bearers of properties? If he thinks that the usual answers are not deep enough, these three substances provide deeper answers. If the apple is unsuitable for the role of bearing properties, since being an apple is a property, a mass of matter, i.e. a collection of particles seems a suitable bearer for this property. There we are deep enough. Why should we dig deeper than the fundamental constituents of reality? 
	In defense of the traditional view one might say that even these fundamental constituents are not deep enough, for being a mass of matter or being a particle are properties that need to be supported by something. But this move runs up against the first objection: we have seen that invoking substance without knowing what it is does not provide an answer. 
	Fourthly, the unpropertied bearer of properties reminds one of the scholastic materia prima, which is supposed to be the mere bearer of properties, i.e. forms, and to be completely devoid of forms itself. Locke rejects the concept of materia prima firmly. The problem is not simply that by resorting to the concept of the unpropertied bearer of properties he would revive a suspiciously scholastic idea, but also that his specific charge against the concept of materia prima can be raised against the concept of unpropertied property bearers as well. He mentions materia prima as an example of a particular abuse of words, namely ‘taking them for things’. This abuse is committed by those who believe that certain words ‘are so suited to the Nature of Things, that they perfectly correspond with their real Existence’.​[16]​ He gives the following example. We form the idea of matter from the idea body by omitting two of its components, the idea of extension and shape, and keeping only solidity. The abuse consists in the belief that there is indeed such an entity which exactly corresponds to this idea and to the word we use as its name.

But since Solidity cannot exist without Extension, and Figure, the taking Matter to be the name of something really existing under that Precision, has no doubt produced those obscure and unintelligible Discourses and Disputes, which have filled the Heads and Books of Philosophers concerning Materia prima [.]​[17]​ 

If substance in general is the unpropertied bearer of properties, then Locke himself is guilty of this abuse. According to the traditional interpretation the idea of substance in general is formed in a way which is similar to the way the idea of matter is formed. We take ideas of substances and start omitting the ideas properties until all that remains is the idea of an unpropertied bearer of properties. Forming ideas in this way is admissible, just as the idea of matter is admissible. What Locke finds inadmissible is the view that ideas formed in this way correspond precisely to some real entity. But on the traditional interpretation the unpropertied bearer of properties is a real entity, and Locke should reject that as an abuse of the word ‘substance’.​[18]​

II
The real essence interpretation​[19]​ suggests that the passage describing how we acquire the idea of substance​[20]​ should be read somewhat differently. What we cannot conceive is not how clusters of observable properties can subsist in themselves but rather how observable properties form clusters, i.e. why they ‘go constantly together’. The constancy of clusters cannot be sheer coincidence, so we cannot avoid presuming that there is something that explains this. It is this presumption which the idea of substance in general is intended to capture. The idea of substance in general is then the idea of something that explains recurrent patterns of observable properties, even if we do not know what that is.
	Substance, understood in this way, does not bear properties, but determines them. Now real essence is “the real internal […] Constitution of Things, whereon their discoverable Qualities depend”.​[21]​ So substance in general is something very much like real essence. Nevertheless, it should not be identified with real essence, because the idea of substance in general is a more general idea.​[22]​ It stands for whatever is responsible for stable clusters of observable properties, independently of what cluster we are talking about. The concept of real essence, in contrast, is attached only to certain clusters, namely those which identify kinds, in the sense of species, like gold or man. In the case of kinds substance in general is the same as real essence. However, not all clusters of observable properties specify kinds. First, such a cluster may correspond to an individual, a particular thing, rather than a kind.​[23]​ Second, body and spirit are also stable clusters of properties, but not kinds in the sense of species. Since they are stable clusters – having cohesive parts goes together with the power to transfer motion by impulse, thinking goes together with will –, we need to assume that there is some explanation, but what provides the explanation is not real essence, since body and spirit, not being kinds, do not have real essence.
	If this is what Locke means by substance in general, our ignorance of it is easy to understand; we are ignorant of substance for the same reason for which we are ignorant of real essence: our senses are not so acute as to reveal to us the underlying structures which explain the clusters of properties we do observe.
	This interpretation is attractive because it attributes to Locke a view which is not implausible in itself and also fits in with Locke’s other views. It is not plagued by the difficulties which emerge on the traditional interpretation. Ignorance of substance is not ignorance in principle but a perfectly ordinary sort of ignorance. This interpretation does not clash with the treatment of substance in the chapter on identity, and it does not lead to the charge that Locke commits a mistake he himself exposes in the thought of others. It has only one disadvantage, but that is a big one: the absence of direct textual support.​[24]​ Locke never formulates explicitly the view which he is supposed to maintain. Moreover, if the idea of substance in general were closely connected to that of real essence, we should expect at least that he occasionally identifies the two tacitly, or drops a hint regarding their connection. But he never does that even though the exchange with Stillingfleet provides very good opportunity to do that. Stillingfleet, talking in the Aristotelian idiom, identifies substance and essence, so Locke could have easily expressed his agreement or reservations; but he simply accepts his critic’s way of talking and does not comment on it. In lieu of explicit statements and implicit hints Locke’s use of terms could lend some credibility to the real essence intepretation. Real essences explain observable properties, so if Locke described the connection between substance and properties in causal or explanatory terms, that would supply circumstantial evidence. There are indeed two passages which employ the causal idiom,​[25]​ but these are the exceptions. Locke usually describes the connection in terms of substance ‘supporting’ properties​[26]​ or properties ‘existing’​[27]​, ‘inhering’​[28]​ or ‘subsisting’​[29]​ in substance. ​[30]​

III
So we have two interpretations which are both problematic, even though for different reasons. Let us now review once again the traditional interpretation to see if it can be improved. We should first notice that three of the difficulties it faces are related to the assumption that substance in general, described as the unpropertied bearer of properties, is an entity, i.e. that substances, people, trees, etc. have some real constituent in them which exactly corresponds to the idea of substance in general. Why should Locke introduce this entity if it does not supply a genuine explanation of the bearing of properties? Why should he need such an entity over and above the fundamental constituents of reality, God, spirits and particles? Why should he commit the mistake of taking words for things by assuming that there is an entity corresponding to the term ‘substance’? If this assumption is abandoned these difficulties disappear.​[31]​
	What remains of the traditional interpretation if this assumption is abandoned? The metaphysical question of what bears properties is then transformed into a conceptual question: how do our ideas of property bearers differ from the ideas of properties? The distinction between things, i.e. substances, and properties is fundamental to our conceptual scheme. To think of an apple as a thing and to think of being apple as a property (composed of some simpler properties) is quite different. What does that difference consist in? I think, this is the question Locke tried to address with the idea of substance in general. This idea is a constituent of our ideas of substances but is missing from the ideas of properties. The idea of an apple contains the idea of substance whereas the idea of being an apple does not.
	What speaks for this view is, first, that the idea of substance in general has all the characteristics it needs if it is indeed meant to explain the conceptual distinction. If we are looking for an idea which distinguishes ideas of things and ideas of properties, this idea needs to have the following characteristics: (a) it has to be included in every idea which is an idea of thing; (b) it should not be identical to any idea which is an idea of a property; (c) it must be one particular idea which is the part of all ideas of things, because all things are things in the same way. The idea of substance in general meets all these requirements. Compare:

The Ideas of Substances are such combinations of simple Ideas, as are taken to represent distinct particular things subsisting by themselves; in which the supposed, or confused Idea of Substance, such as it is, is always first and chief.​[32]​ 

[O]ur complex Ideas of Substances, besides all these simple Ideas they are made up of, have always the confused Idea of something to which they belong, and in which they subsist: and therefore when we speak of any sort of Substance, we say it is a thing having such or such Qualities, as Body is a thing that is extended, figured, and capable of Motion; a Spirit a thing capable of thinking; and so Hardness, Friability, and Power to draw Iron, we say, are Qualities to be found in a Loadstone. These, and the like fashions of speaking intimate, that the Substance is supposed always something besides the Extension, Figure, Solidity, Motion, Thinking[.]​[33]​ (italics added)

[T]he general idea of substance being the same everywhere[.]​[34]​ 

The first quote shows that the idea of substance in general has characteristics (a), the second shows that it has (a) and (b), the third shows that it has (c). 




The conceptual version of the traditional interpretation gets rid of the problems of the metaphysical version, but it raises a further question question. Locke was not thinking of substance like Kant. He did not regard the idea of substance a concept of understanding necessary for the organization of experience which might not correspond to any metaphysically real entity. In his response to Stillingleet he makes perfectly clear that substance in general is not just an idea, it does exist. ​[35]​ But what is the entity substance like, and how is related to atoms and finite spirits, the fundamental constituents of reality?  The metaphysical version has an answer to these questions, even if it is fraught with difficulties. The conceptual version does not have an answer. If it is a correct interpretation, then Locke just failed follow through his conception.
	This deficiency, one might think, is not so grave as to undermine the conceptual version of the traditional interpretation. If Locke’s concern with subtance in general was motivated by an interest in capturing the conceptual distinction, it is quite possible that he just did not give much thought to what the real world counterpart of the idea could be. He may have simply assumed that there must be something corresponding to the idea, because he believed that the distinction between substances and properties is real, i.e. it is founded in reality. After all, how could the distinction be real, if the idea which distinguishes between ideas of substances and ideas of properties, does not have anything corresponding to it in the real order? So he made this assumption and had no further interest in the ontology of substance.​[36]​
	There is one point though which suggests that it might be worth trying to supplement the conceptual version of the traditional interpretation with elements of the real essence view. This is Locke’s long discussion of body and soul in the second half of the chapter on substance, which was already mentioned. To recapitulate, Locke claims that the idea of soul is just as clear as the idea of body. We have equally clear ideas of the fundamental properties of soul and body – thinking and will, cohesion and communication of motion – but we have no explanation of these properties. We do not know how a spirit thinks, and how it starts motion, nor do we know how atoms cohere and how they communicate motion. Locke sometimes describes this ignorance as ignorance of the substance of soul and body, and it is clear that by substance he means that in which these fundamental properties reside. He writes:

If anyone says, he knows not what ‘tis thinks in him; he knows not what the substance is of that thinking thing: No more, say I, knows he what the substance is of that solid thing.​[37]​

If we would enquire farther into their Nature, Causes and Manner, we perceive not the Nature of Extension clearer than we do of Thinking. If we would explain them any farther, one is as easie as the other; and there is no more difficulty, to conceive how a Substance, we know not, should by thought set Body into motion, than how a Substance we know not, should by impulse set Body into motion.​[38]​ 

So that, in short, the Idea we have of Spirits, compared with the Idea we have of Body, stands thus: The substance of Spirit is unknown to us; and so is the substance of Body, equally unknown to us: Two primary Qualities, or Properties of Body, viz. solid coherent parts, and impulse, we have distinct clear ideas of: So likewise we know, and have distinct clear Ideas of two primary qualities, or Properties of Spirits, viz. Thinking and a Power of Action; i.e. a power of beginning, or stopping several Thoughts or Motions.​[39]​ 

In these passages Locke identifies our ignorance of the causes the fundamental qualities of body and soul with our ignorance of their substance. This suggests that we if we knew their substance, we could explain their fundamental qualities. If substance is something that can explain properties, it is something like real essence, just as the real essence interpretation advocates.
	But how could we conjoin the real essence interpretation with the conceptual version of the traditional interpretation? According to the former, substance, the entity, is what explains the observable properties. According to the latter, substance, the idea, is what makes the difference between ideas of things and ideas of properties. These are two completely different doctrines. How can they be connected? Here is the crucial idea. Locke holds that ideas of substances serve ‘to represent distinct particular things subsisting by themselves’.​[40]​ If substances, like man or gold, exist independently of us, our epistemic access to them may be so limited that we cannot form completely adequate ideas of them. Indeed, Locke believes that we are largely ignorant of the nature of substances, because our senses are not sufficiently accute to inform us about the primary qualities of the particles of which they consist. So subtances have unknown nature. They also have something in them which corresponds to the idea of substance in general. What I want to claim is that these two are identical: substance in general, i.e. the real world counterpart of the idea of substance in general is the unknown nature. What corresponds in a given substance, like gold, to the idea of substance in general which is included in the idea of gold is the unknown nature of gold. From here it is but a short step to the real essence interpretation. If our epistemic access to substances were not limited, if we knew their nature, we could explain why they have the observable properties they do have. The source of the observable properties, knowledge of which would enable us to explain them , is, in the case of kinds, real essence.  So substance in general is something like real essence; in the case of kinds it is real essence.  
	To show that this is what Locke is likely to have thought, I will construct an argument which takes us from the claim that substances contain something corresponding to the idea of substance in general to the claim that that something is identical to what explains the known nature of substances, i.e. their observable properties. Locke does not formulate this argument, not even in rudimentary form, so I do not think this is an argument he actually thought through; it is rather an explanation of why, given his various commitments, he could have found it natural to make the identification I claim he made. So here is the argument.

(1)	Something is a substance if and only if there is something in it which corresponds to the idea of substance in general.
(2)	Something is a substance if and only if it has unknown nature.
(3)	What corresponds in a substance to the idea of substance in general is identical to the unknown nature of the substance.
(4)	What explains the observable properties of a substance is identical to its unknown nature.
(5)	What corresponds in a substance to the idea of substance in general is identical to what explains its observable properties.

What I have to show is not that this argument is cogent in our terms but that Locke himself should have found this argument cogent and thereby could have arrived at the idea that substance in general is something like real essence. If we look at this argument in this way, it is the first part of the argument, (1) through (3), which raises serious concerns. 
	The core of the first part is this: there are two things which we find with substances and only with substances, so the two are identical. First problem. (2) is a biconditional, and it needs to be a biconditional, otherwise it does not stand a chance. The left-right direction is right: Locke certainly holds that substances have unkown nature. But the right-left direction seems dubious. Did Locke really believe that what has unknown nature is a substance? Why should he have believed that? These questions will be answered in Section V. 
Second problem. The inference to (3) is not deductively valid. If there are two things which are present with all and only the members of a class, it does not follow that two are the same. If all and only philosphers had a PhD in philosophy and all and only philosophers had Porsches, that would not imply that a PhD in philosophy is a Porsche. Of course, Locke could have argued non-deductively, but then we would need an explanation as to why he should have found the argument plausible. In Section VI I replace the first half of the argument with a more detailed version which is deductively valid.

V
And now to the first problem. It has to be shown that Locke was committed to the following claim: whatever has unknown nature is a substance. It is crucial to understand this claim right. On the one hand there is the idea, on the other hand there is the object of the idea, that of which the idea is the mental sign. The nature of the object of the idea is unknown if  there is something about the object of the idea which is not captured by the idea, if the object has features which do not show up in the idea. What needs to be established is then this: if an object represented by an idea has features which are not expressed in the idea, than that object is a substance. I must begin from afar.
	Locke distinguishes between four types of ideas: simple ideas, ideas of substances, of modes and of relations. Relations, however, are not worth treating separately, since from the end of Book II on Locke does not discuss them separately either, but merely remarks occasionally that they behave like modes.​[41]​ What we need to examine then is how successful simple ideas, ideas of modes and ideas of substances are in capturing their respective objects.
	Locke’s term for what I called the object of an idea is ‘archetype’, ‘which the Mind supposes them [the ideas] taken from; which it intends them to stand for’.​[42]​ The relation between the idea and its archetype is systematically different in the case of the three types of ideas. Simple ideas and ideas of substances are ectypa, i.e. copies,​[43]​ whereas ideas of modes are themselves archetypes. This distinction expresses the conception that simple ideas and ideas of substances are intended to stand for something real, something that exists, whereas this is not true of modes. Ideas of modes ‘are Originals and Archetypes; are not Copies, nor made after the Pattern of any real Existence, to which the Mind intends them to be conformable and exactly to answer’.​[44]​ What Locke has in mind here is best illustrated with the example of the two most important sorts of ideas within this category, geometrical ideas and moral ideas. When it comes to these ideas, we do not regard it as a deficiency if there is nothing in reality which corresponds to them. If there were no physical surface which were exactly triangular, that would provide no reason to discard the idea of a triangle or to modify so that it would fit some real physical surface. Similarly, should it turn out that no person is actually honest, we would not feel obliged to discard the idea of honesty or to change it so that it could be applied to some people. Ideas of modes are not required to match something real, or to put it in modern terms, they are not required to be instantiated.​[45]​ By saying that they are archetypes Locke means that they have no archetype different from themselves.
	Simple ideas and ideas of substances, on the other hand, are both expected to match archetypes different from themselves, but due to the fact that they are shaped diffently, they do not have the same chance of meeting this expectation. Simple ideas are acquired passively, they appear in our mind spontaneously due to the powers of things outside. What a simple idea has to match, its archetype, is simply the power which causes it. As a result, they are automatic products of their archetypes. Since they emerge automatically, as effects of brute causal processes, they necessarily meet the expectation. If the power, which is the archetype, did not exist, we just would not come to possess the idea in question. Ideas of substances, however, are not acquired passively. Their acquisition is guided by recurrent patterns of properties, but the patterns we are exposed to do not completely determine which simple ideas will be included in the the idea of substance. People who are more attentive or have scientific interests include more simple ideas than others. Here we have an element of arbitrariness which is missing in the case of simple ideas.
	To see how Locke’s scheme works let us consider first which types of ideas are ‘real’. Locke calls those ideas real which ‘have a Foundation in Nature; such as have a Conformity with the real Being, and Existence of Things, or with their Archetypes’​[46]​ He employs this disjunctive definition – conformity with the existence of things or with the archetype – because he cannot demand of ideas of modes that they should match some existing item, since ideas of modes are not ectypa. If he demanded conformity with existing items, geometrical and ethical ideas could be criticised on the same grounds as ideas of centaurs and mermaids, i.e. on grounds of failure to capture entities which exist. If, however, they are expected to match their archetypes, then they are all real: being their own archetypes, they certainly correspond to their archetypes.​[47]​
	The reality of ideas subtances is not likewise guaranteed: ‘being made all of them in reference to Things existing without us, and intended to be Representations of Substances, as they really are, are no farther real then as they are such Combinations of simple ideas, as are really united, and co-exist in Things without us’.​[48]​ Ideas of centaurs, for instance, are not real, since having human head and upper body is never conjoined with having the lower body of a horse.
	The case of simple ideas is a bit more complicated. Automatic products, as they are, we should think that they are all real. But what should we make of the ideas of secondary qualities, which are not caused by special, sui generis qualities, but by combinations of primary qualities? How could the idea of white be real, if all that there is in a white body is a combinations of particles with certain primary qualities? Locke replies that even ideas of secondary qualities are real, for what they have to match is a power, and not the categorical foundation of that power.

But though Whiteness and Coldness are no more in Snow, than Pain is; yet those Ideas of Whiteness, and Coldness, Pain, etc. being in us the Effects of Powers in Things without us, ordained by our Maker, to produce in us such Sensations; they are real Ideas in us, whereby we distinguish the Qualities, that are really in things themselves. For these several Appearances, being designed to be the Marks, whereby we are to know, and distinguish Things, which we have to do with; our Ideas do as well serve us to that purpose, and are as real distinguishing Characters, whether they be only constant Effects, or else exact Resemblances of something in the things themselves: the reality lying in the steady correspondence, they have with the distinct Constitutions of real Beings.​[49]​ 

The characteristically different relations the three types of ideas have to their archetype does not yet prove Locke’s commitment that whatever has unknown nature is substance. To see that we need to examine what he says about the adequacy of ideas.
An idea is adequate if and only if it is a perfect representation of its archetype.​[50]​ By perfect representation Locke means one-to-one correspondence betweeen the properties of the archetype and the consituents of the idea. If the archetype has a certain property, the idea has to include a constituent which is a sign of that property. Simple ideas have no constituents, and their archetype is the power of things which causes them to appear in our minds. Since a power is a single property – as opposed to its categorical basis –, there is nothing in a power which is not captured by the corresponding simple idea. Therefore, simple ideas are all adequate.

And so each Sensation answering that the Power, that operates on any of our Senses, the Idea so produced, is a real Idea, (and not a fiction of the Mind, which has no power to produce any simple Idea;) and cannot but be adequate, since it ought only to answer that power: and so all simple ideas are adequate.​[51]​ 

Locke adds that this is also true of ideas of secondary qualities, since even these correspond to the powers of which they are the effects. They do not reveal the categorical basis of the power, but that is not their job. Their job is to serve as ‘distinguishing Characters’, and they do that.
	Ideas of modes are also all adequate. Being their own archetypes, they necessarily represent every property of the archetype.
	Ideas of substances stand alone in being in inadequate. These are referred to two different archetypes: real essences and clusters of observable properties, and whichever we take, they are all inadequate.​[52]​ First, people usually and mistakenly take these ideas to stand for real essences, i.e. what explains the observable properties characteristic of the species.​[53]​ But our ideas of substances do not provide such explanations, as Locke repeatedly points out. The idea of iron, for example, is made up for various simple ideas of weight, colour, hardness, etc., and these do not explain why iron is malleable. So the ideas of substances do not capture real essences. Second, the real archetypes of ideas of substances are clusters of observable properties. Those properties, however, the ideas of which are included in the idea of a given substance, are conjoined with several properties the ideas of which are not included in the compound idea of the substance. Iron, the idea of which includes certain simple ideas of weight, colour, hardness, malleability, has an enormous number of properties which are not represented in the idea. The scientists’ ideas of substances capture more properties than those of the laymen, and are more adequate, but even these capture only a fraction of the properties substances possess.​[54]​ The chief reason for this limitation is that the ideas of observable properties are usually ideas of powers, and substances have an enormous number of powers we do not know about. Powers are manifested only under special conditions, and if do not examine the substance in question under these conditions – i.e. if we do not perform the appropriate experiments –, these powers remain hidden from our view. 
	We have seen that simple ideas and ideas of modes are all adequate, but ideas of substances are not. To have an adequate idea of something is to include all of its properties, i.e. to capture its entire nature. Therefore, if we have an adequate idea of something then the nature of that thing is completely known. Hence, the objects of simple ideas and modes do not have unknown nature, and whatever has unknown nature is substance. This is what I needed to show that Locke is committed to premise (2) of the argument outlined in the preceeding section.
Nevertheless, one might worry that Locke’s account of adequacy is not sufficient to prove his commitment to (2). Even though simple ideas are adequate, it seems that their object does have an unknown nature. Take a secondary quality, like red. Even though the idea of red represents perfectly this quality as a power, it does not represent at all the categorical basis of that power. So there is something about the property red we do not know. Would not this mean that red has, after all, has unknown nature, and the adequacy of an idea does not amount to complete knowledge of the nature of its object?
To see that this worry is unjustified we have to turn briefly to Locke’s discussion of real essence. Each idea is a nominal essence of a species, it is a criterion which specifies what entities the idea stands for, and thereby gives meaning to the name of the species. Real essence is what explains the properties of the species. When it comes to the issue whether nominal essence is identical to real essence, we see the same pattern as in the case the reality and adequacy of ideas: simple ideas and ideas of modes are guaranteed to succeed, ideas of substances do not. Simple ideas and ideas of modes are both nominal and real essences,​[55]​ whereas ideas of substances are nominal essences, but not real essences. The worry just raised may be reformulated as a worry about Locke’s identification of the nominal essence and the real essence in the case of simple ideas. Surely, the idea we have of red does not explain why red things are red or, at best, it provides an explanation which is nearly tautologous: red things are red in virtue of having the power to bring about the idea of red in our minds. A genuine explanation should describe the categorical basis of that power, and simple ideas do no supply a description of that kind. Nevertheless, Locke’s identification can be defended: there is just no explanation deeper that the nearly tautologous one. Real essence explains the properties of the species, and if we want to explain why all red things are red, i.e. if we want a general explanation of redness, the only explanation we can get is the nearly tautologous one. Red things are red for different reasons. When we take different individuals which have the power to produce the idea of red, the categorical basis of that power is not the same. Blood-orange, red ink and a red area on the computer screen may have nothing in common apart from the power to produce the idea of red. It is not like in the case of substances when we presuppose that the properties shared by all particular pieces of iron have the same explanation, that those properties derive from some common underlying structure or mechanism. So the answer to the worry is just this. The property red as such has no other nature than being a power of certain kind. We know all about red that can be known it at this level of abstraction.

VI
Now I come to the second problem. Let me repeat the first half of the argument proposed earlier.

(1)	Something is a substance if and only if there is something in it which corresponds to the idea of substance in general.
(2)	Something is a substance if and only if it has unknown nature.
(3)	What corresponds in a substance to the idea of substance in general is identical to the unknown nature of the substance.

The problem is that the inference seems arbitrary. It is not valid, and it is not even highly plausible. If there are two things in a substance, unknown nature and what corresponds to the idea of substance in general, what reason do we have to suppose that the two are the same? If the inference is arbitrary, it would be gratuitous to attribute it to Locke.
	I suggest that the gap between the premises and the conclusion can be bridged if we add a further premise, namely that no unpropertied bearer of properties exists, i.e. there is no such entity which the metaphysical version of the traditional interpretation takes to correspond to the idea of substance in general. If this premise is accepted, then there is nothing in a substance apart from its known nature and its unknown nature, and since the real world counterpart of the idea of substance in general cannot be the former, it must be the latter. Spelled our more explicitly, the argument goes as follows.

(1)	Something is a substance if and only if there is something in it which corresponds to the idea of substance in general.
(2)	Something is a substance if and only if it has unknown nature.
(21)	If no unpropertied bearer of properties exists, there is nothing in a substance apart from its known nature and unknown nature.
(22)	No unpropertied bearer of property exists.
(23)	There is nothing in a substance apart from its known nature and unknown nature.
(24)	What corresponds to the idea of substance in general in a substance is either its known nature or its unknown nature.
(25)	What corresponds to the idea of substance in general is not its known nature.
(3)	What corresponds to the idea of substance in general is identical to the unknown nature of the substance.

Let me remind again that this is not an argument Locke makes but an explanation of how he could have arrived at the position I attribute to him. An explanation of this kind is successful only if it does not saddle the author with views he would not accept. Now this argument involves only doctrines which are either natural consequences of his views or obvious in their own terms.
(21) is fairly obvious. In Section I I argued that the view that Locke postulated the existence of an unpropertied bearer of properties is implausible, so I take (22) to be established. (23) is just a simple consequence of  (21) and (22). 
(24) is not a strict deductive conclusion form (1) and (23), because it is possible that the real world counterpart of the idea of substance in general includes parts both from the known and the unknown nature of the substance. But Locke could not have held such view, first because he says that we are completely ignorant of substance in general, second because he holds that subtance in general is something different than the properties we do know. Adding the denial of possibility as a premise would make the inference to (24) valid.
Locke would also accept (25), for the second reason just mentioned: ‘Substance is supposed always something besides the Extension, Figure, Solidity, Motion, Thinking’.​[56]​ (24) and (25) imply (3).

VII
I have argued that Locke introduced the idea of substance in general to express the conceptual difference between things and properties. I have also argued that it would not have been implausible within his theory to identify the real world counterpart of the idea of substance in general with something like real essence. But do we have any reason to think that he made this identification? We have already seen that there is no evidence for that in the text of the Essay or in his reply to Stillingfleet. If there is no textual evidence, linking substance in general and real essence is purely a theoretical possibility rather than Locke’s view. Now I would like to show that the Drafts of the Essay do provide textual evidence.
	In §1 of Draft A Locke writes,

The senses by frequent conversations with certain objects finde that a certaine number of those simple ideas goe constan<t>ly togeather which therefor the understanding takes to belong to one thing & therefor words following our apprehensions are called soe united in one subject by one name, which by inadvertency we are apt afterwards to talke of & consider as one simple Idea, which is indeed a complicaton of many simple Ideas togeather & soe are all Ideas of substances as man, horse sun water Iron, upon the heareing of which words every one who understands the languages presently frames in his imagination the severall simple Ideas which are the immediate objects of his sense, which because he cannot apprehend how they should subsist alone he supposes they rest & are united in some fit & common subject which being as it were the support of those sensible qualitys he cals substance of mater, though it be certain that he hath noe other idea of that matter but what he hath barely of those sensible qualitys supposd to be inhærent in it.​[57]​

This passage is the precursor to II.23.1. of the Essay introducing the idea of substance in general. See how Locke continues.

([W]here by I thinke I may take notice that the Idea of matter is as remote from our understanding & apprehensions as that of spirit & and therefor form our haveing any notion of the essence of one we can noe more conclude its non existence then we can of the other[.])​[58]​

Clearly, Locke identifies here the substance of matter, which supports its sensible properties, with the essence of matter.
	In §2 the identification of essence and substance or substratum is even more explicit:

[I]t is evident that haveing noe other Idea or notion of body but something wherein those many sensible qualitys which affect our senses doe subsist, by supposeing a substance wherein thinking knowing doubting hopeing fearing &c doe subsist we have as clear a notion of the essence of a spirit as any one hath of the essence of body, the one being supposed to be without knowing what it is the substratum to those simple Ideas that we receive from without & the other supposd (with a like ignorance of what it is) to be the subst<r>atum to those actions we experiment in our selves within.​[59]​

The same idea recurs in Draft B as well.​[60]​
	The term ’essence’, as it is used in these passages, surely does not stand for what Locke later comes to call nominal essence. But that alone does not guarantee that what he calls essence here is related to what he later calls real essence. One might worry that ’essence’ as used in the Drafts is just another term for ’substance’, and when Locke, in the Essay, comes to draw an explicit distinction between real essence and nominal essence, he stops using the term in this way precisely because he wants to avoid confusion, i.e. confusing substance with real essence.
	This worry can be put to rest if we observe that in the other places where ’essence’ occurs in the Drafts it is used in the sense of real essence. In the Essay the conclusion that we cannot have a science of bodies is based, among others, on the consideration of the universal propositions we may formulate about substances. If the universal proposition attributes to a substance some property whose idea is included in the nominal essence of the substance question, we do know that proposition, but the proposition is purely verbal. In contrast, if we predicate of a substance something whose idea is not part of the nominal essence, the proposition is not verbal, but our acceptance of the proposition needs to be grounded in experience, so it is not certain, it is judgment rather than knowledge. Instructive knowledge of substances requires knowledge the real essences of substances, but we do not have that knowledge.​[61]​
This point seems to be expressed in §13 of Draft A:

But when I proceed to universall propositions. v.g all milke is white & this is either when I affirme a simple Idea of any name which simple Idea I conteine in the very diffintion of that name, & then the proposition is always true but also only verbal, as a man is rational for I have noe certain knowledg that things doe so exist. Unlesse it be when I certainly know the specific essential Ideas that belong to every particular individual of any species, (which can be had only by the testimony of my owne senses & observation & soe seldom happens) & then I have a certain knowledg that such an universal proposition is true of things soe existing extra without me. Or else when I have observd this simple Idea to belong to all the individuals of that species that my senses have met with & then predicate it of but doe not include it in the definition of the name of that species & then the predication is real but not certainly true nor have I a certain knowledg of it.​[62]​

In the Drafts Locke does not yet introduce the terms ’nominal essence’ and ’real essence’, but the point he makes here is essentially the same as the one he makes in the Essay in those terms. So the expression ’specific essential idea’ stands for the idea of the real essence. Notice, however, that the remark in parenthesis is somewhat puzzling: it suggests that we do occasionally know real essences.
	Better evidence is provided by a passage in Draft B where we find Locke constrasting what he later calls real essence and nominal essence with the term ’essence’ applied in sense of the former:

[S]oe men have beeen lead into a fruitlesse enquiry after the essences of things thereby to finde their different species whereas to me the specific constitution & and difference of things seemes to be noe thing else, but collecting a certeine number of simple Ideas, which usualy have been observed to goe togeather, in order to the nameing of the things in which they are found soe united for the conceniency of memory & discourse[.]​[63]​

If Locke uses ’essence’ in the Drafts for what he calls real essence in the Essay, the earlier passages indeed show that he connected the concepts of substance in general and real essence.
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